We use a simple quantitative asset pricing model to "reverse-engineer" the sequences of stochastic shocks to housing demand and lending standards that are needed to exactly replicate the boom-bust patterns in U.S. household real estate value and mortgage debt over the period 1995 to 2012. Conditional on the observed paths for U.S. disposable income growth and the mortgage interest rate, we consider four di¤erent speci…cations of the model that vary according to the way that household expectations are formed (rational versus moving average forecast rules) and the maturity of the mortgage contract (one-period versus long-term). We …nd that the model with moving average forecast rules and long-term mortgage debt does best in plausibly matching the patterns observed in the data. Counterfactual simulations show that shifting lending standards (as measured by a loan-to-equity limit) were an important driver of the episode while movements in the mortgage interest rate were not. Our results lend support to the view that the U.S. housing boom was a classic credit-fueled bubble involving over-optimistic projections about future housing values, relaxed lending standards, and ine¤ective mortgage regulation.
Introduction 1.Overview
Starting in the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy experienced correlated booms and busts in household real estate value, household mortgage debt, and personal consumption expenditures (all measured relative to personal disposable income), as shown in Figure 1 . The ratio of housing value to income peaked in 2005.Q4. The ratio of mortgage debt to income peaked 8 quarters later in 2007.Q4-coinciding with the start of the Great Recession. Throughout this period, the ratio of imputed housing rent to disposable income declined steadily. 1 Given that rents are a measure of the "dividend" or service ‡ow from housing, the quiet behavior of rents during the boom lends support to non-fundamental explanations of the episode. Our aim is to develop a transparent quantitative model that can account for the patterns observed in Figure 1 . In so doing, we assess the plausibility of the driving forces that are needed to make the model …t the data.
A wide variety of empirical evidence links the U.S. housing boom to relaxed lending standards. 2 The report of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) emphasizes the e¤ects of a self-reinforcing feedback loop in which an in ‡ux of new homebuyers with access to easy mortgage credit helped fuel an excessive run-up in house prices. The run-up, in turn, encouraged lenders to ease credit further on the assumption that house prices would continue to rise. As house prices rose, the lending industry marketed a range of exotic mortgage products, e.g., loans requiring no down payment or documentation of income, monthly payments for interest-only or less, and adjustable rate mortgages with low introductory 'teaser' rates that reset higher over time. Within the United States, house prices rose faster in areas where subprime and exotic mortgages were more prevalent (Mian and Su… 2009 , Pavlov and Wachter 2011 , Berkovec, Chang, and McManus 2012 . In a given area, past house price appreciation had a signi…cant positive in ‡uence on subsequent loan approval rates in the same area (Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2012, Goetzmann, Peng, and Yen 2012) .
In the aftermath of the 2001 recession, the Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds rate to just 1% and held it there for over 12 months during 2003 and 2004. While some studies …nd evidence that low interest rates were an important contributor to the run-up in house prices (Taylor 2007, McDonald and Stokes 2011) others argue that low interest rates were not a signi…cant factor (Dokko, et al. 2011, Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko 2013) . Aside from the possible e¤ect on house prices, there is clear evidence that low mortgage interest rates during this period set o¤ a re…nancing boom, allowing consumers to tap the equity in their homes to pay for all kinds of goods and services. According to data compiled by Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) , free cash generated by home equity extraction contributed an average of $136 billion per year in personal consumption expenditures from 2001 to 2006-more than triple the average yearly contribution of $44 billion from 1996 to 2000 (p. 131) . Kermani (2012) …nds that U.S. counties that experienced the largest increases in house prices from 2000 to 2006 also tended to experience the largest increases in auto sales over the same period. The same counties tended to su¤er the largest declines in auto sales from 2006 to 2009 when house prices were falling. 3 Similarly, Mian and Su… (2014) identify a signi…cant e¤ect on auto spending that operates through home equity borrowing during the period 2002 to 2006. Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) argue that the U.S. consumption boom from 1996 to 2006 was driven mainly by bubbly movements in house prices, not lower real interest rates.
In this paper, we use four di¤erent versions of a simple quantitative asset pricing model to "reverse-engineer" the sequences of stochastic shocks that are needed to match the boombust patterns observed in Figure 1 . The four model speci…cations di¤er according to the way that household expectations are formed (rational versus moving average forecast rules) or the maturity of the mortgage contract (one-period versus long-term). Conditional on the observed paths for U.S. disposable income growth and the mortgage interest rate, we back-out sequences for: (1) a shock to housing preferences, and (2) a shock to lending standards (as measured by a loan-to-equity limit) so as to exactly replicate the boom-bust patterns in household real estate value and mortgage debt over the period 1995.Q1 to 2012.Q4, as plotted in the top panels of Figure 1 . We also examine the model predictions for the evolution of other variables, such as the rent-income ratio and the consumption-income ratio.
Under rational expectations, we show that the model requires large and persistent housing preference shocks to account for the boom-bust cycle in U.S. housing value from 1995 to 2012. According to the model, an increase in housing preference will increase the housing service ‡ow, as measured by the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing. Consequently, the rational expectations model predicts a similar boom-bust cycle in the ratio of housing rent to income. But this did not happen in the data.
As an alternative to rational expectations, we consider a setup where households employ simple moving average forecast rules, i.e., adaptive expectations. This type of forecast rule is consistent with a wide variety of survey evidence that directly measures agents'expectations (Coibion and Gorodnichencko 2012, Williams 2013) . We show that the moving average model can match the boom-bust cycle in U.S. housing value with much smaller movements in the housing preference shock. This is because the household's forecast rule embeds a unit root which serves to magnify asset price volatility in response to shocks. 4 Consequently, the moving average model does a much better job of matching the quiet behavior of the U.S. rent-income ratio plotted in the lower left panel of Figure 1 . More generally, the moving average model captures the idea that much of the run-up in U.S. house prices and credit during the boom years appears to be linked to an in ‡ux of unsophisticated homebuyers. Given their inexperience, these buyers would be more likely to employ simple backward-looking forecast rules for future house prices, income, lending standards, etc. One can also make the case that many U.S. lenders behaved similarly by approving subprime and exotic mortgage loans that could only be repaid if housing values continued to trend upward. 5 Mortgage debt in the model is governed by a standard collateral constraint that depends on the market value of the housing stock. With one-period mortgage contracts, the entire stock of outstanding debt is re…nanced each period, causing the stock of debt to move in tandem with housing value. All else equal, the one-period debt model would therefore predict a rapid deleveraging from 2006 onwards when U.S. housing values were falling rapidly. In the data, however, the deleveraging proceeded gradually, as debt declined at a much slower pace than housing value. To avoid the counterfactual prediction of a rapid deleveraging, the one-period debt model requires a post-2007 relaxation of lending standards (a larger loanto-equity limit) to simultaneously match the patterns of housing value and mortgage debt in the data. This prediction con ‡icts with evidence from the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS) which shows that banks started to tighten lending standards before the onset of the Great Recession and often continued to tighten standards even after the recession ended.
Following Kydland, Rupert, and Šustek (2012) , we model long-term mortgage debt by approximating the amortization schedule of a conventional 30-year mortgage loan. Such a loan has the feature that the borrower's early payments consist mainly of interest while later payments consist mainly of principal. With long-term mortgages, the borrowing constraint applies only to new loans, not to the entire stock of outstanding mortgage debt. In any given period, the representative household's new loan cannot exceed a fraction of accumulated home equity. When the borrowing constraint is binding, a sustained period of progressively relaxed lending standards leads to an increase in the ‡ow of new loans which, in turn, contributes to a buildup in household leverage. A rapid decline in housing value leads to a rapid decline in ‡ow of new loans, but the stock of outstanding mortgage debt declines slowly, as in the data. Using impulse response functions, we show that models with long-term mortgage debt exhibit the feature that the housing value-income ratio peaks earlier than the mortgage debt-income ratio, consistent with the data plotted in Figure 1 . Now when we undertake the reverse-engineering exercise, we identify a relaxation of lending standards during the boom years of 2001 to 2005 followed by a period of progressively tightening lending standards, consistent with the SLOOS data. The reverse-engineered shifts in lending standards produce the necessary ‡ow of new 5 According to the report of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 70, new subprime mortgage originations went from $100 billion in the year 2000 to around $650 billion at the peak in 2006. In that year, subprime mortgages represented 23.5% of all new mortgages originated. On p. 165, the report states "Overall, by 2006, no-doc or low-doc loans made up 27% of all mortgages originated." loans to allow the model to match the path of the debt-income ratio in the data.
Given the reverse-engineered paths for the stochastic shocks, all models imply similar paths for the consumption-income ratio. According to the household budget constraint, the consumption-income ratio is driven primarily by movements in the debt-income ratio and the mortgage interest rate which, by construction, are the same across models for the reverseengineering exercise. We show that a smoothed version of a typical model-implied path for the consumption-income ratio roughly resembles the hump-shaped pattern observed in the U.S. data from 1995 to 2012.
A virtue of our reverse-engineering approach is that we can construct counterfactual scenarios by shutting o¤ a particular shock sequence and then examining the evolution of model variables versus those in the U.S. data. For example, shutting o¤ the reverse-engineered housing preference shock in the rational expectations model serves to completely eliminate the boom-bust cycle in housing value. In contrast, the moving average model continues to generate a boom-bust cycle, albeit smaller in magnitude, due to the asset price response to the other identi…ed shocks. This result illustrates the ability of the moving average model to generate a credit-fueled boom in housing value.
When we shut o¤ the reverse-engineered lending standard shock, the models with longterm mortgage debt exhibit no signi…cant run-up in debt, regardless of the expectation regime. This result indicates that shifting lending standards were an important driver of the boom-bust episode. Put another way, the amplitude of the boom-bust episode could have been mitigated if mortgage regulators had been more vigilant in enforcing prudent lending standards.
When we shut o¤ the income growth shock, only the moving average model with longterm mortgages exhibits smaller boom-bust cycles in both housing value and debt. This result implies that movements in income growth did contribute something to the episode according to this version of the model. When we shut o¤ the mortgage interest rate shock, all of the models continue to exhibit signi…cant boom-bust cycles in both housing value and debt. This is because the magnitude of the mortgage interest rate drop in the data is simply too small to have much impact on the trajectories of housing value and debt. According to the models, movements in the U.S. mortgage interest rate were not an important driver of the episode. Overall, we …nd that the moving average model with long-term mortgage debt does best in plausibly matching the patterns plotted in Figure 1 .
A common feature of all bubbles is the emergence of seemingly-plausible fundamental arguments that seek to justify the dramatic rise in asset prices. During the boom years of the U.S. housing market, many economists and policymakers argued that a housing bubble did not exist and that numerous fundamental factors were driving the run-ups in housing values and mortgage debt. 6 Commenting on the rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan (2005) o¤ered the view that the lending industry had been dramatically transformed by advances in information technology: "Where once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now able to quite e¢ ciently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk appropriately." In a July 1, 2005 interview on the CNBC network, Ben Bernanke, then Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, asserted that fundamental factors such as strong growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, demographics, and restricted supply were supporting U.S. house prices. In the same interview, Bernanke stated his view that a substantial nationwide decline in house prices was "a pretty unlikely possibility." In a review of the New York Fed's forecasting record leading up to the Great Recession, Potter (2011) acknowledges a "misunderstanding of the housing boom. . . [which] downplayed the risk of a substantial fall in house prices"and a "lack of analysis of the rapid growth of new forms of mortgage …nance."Our results lend support to the view that the U.S. housing boom was a classic credit-fueled bubble involving over-optimistic projections about future housing values, relaxed lending standards, and ine¤ective mortgage regulation.
Related Literature
Numerous recent studies have employed quantitative theoretical models to try to replicate various aspects of the boom-bust cycle in the U.S. housing market. Most of these studies preempt bubble explanations by assuming that all agents are fully rational. For example, taking the observed paths of U.S. house prices, aggregate income, and interest rates as given, Chen, Michaux, and Roussanov (2013) show that an estimated DSGE model with rational expectations and long-term mortgages can match the boom-bust patterns in U.S. household debt and consumption. Their quantitative exercise is similar in spirit to ours with the important exception that they do not attempt to explain movements in U.S. house prices.
Standard dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) models with fully-rational expectations have di¢ culty producing large swings in housing values that resemble the patterns observed in the U.S. and other countries. Indeed, it is common for such models to employ extremely large and persistent exogenous shocks to rational agents' preferences for housing in an e¤ort to bridge the gap between the model and the data. 7 We obtain a similar result here when we impose rational expectations. But, as noted above, large housing preference shocks are not a plausible explanation for the boom-bust episode because these shocks generate extremely large movements in the imputed housing rent, which are counterfactual. We show that households'use of moving average forecast rules serves to shrink substantially the required magnitude of the housing preference shocks that are needed to match the data. Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2014) develop a stylized model that distinguishes between a credit supply constraint and the more conventional borrowing constraint. They argue that the U.S. housing boom is best explained as a relaxation of the credit supply constraint, as this reduces mortgage interest rates and thereby can generate a sizeable increase in the steady-state house price. In their quantitative exercises, they compare sequences of steady states, where each movement in the credit supply limit "is unanticipated by the agents"(p. 24). Hence, their proposed explanation can be interpreted as departing from rational expectations, as done here. In contrast to their approach, our simulations account for the model's out-ofsteady-state transition dynamics. We …nd that the observed decline in the U.S. real mortgage interest was not a signi…cant contributor to the run-up in U.S. housing value-consistent with the empirical …ndings of Dokko, et al. (2011) and Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2013) . In this regard, it's worth noting that U.S. real mortgage interest rates continued to decline for several years after 2007 while housing values also continued to fall. Our model ascribes a key role to relaxed borrowing constraints, consistent with the empirical evidence on the rapid growth of subprime mortgage lending during the boom years. Chu (2014) develops a life cycle model of housing demand with fully-rational agents and one-period mortgage debt. He …nds that a 10% increase in household income combined with the elimination of a mortgage down payment requirement can generate a substantial increase in the steady-state ratio of housing value to rent. However, the transition period between the two steady states in his model is unrealistically long-in excess of 100 years. Doblas-Madrid and Lansing (2014) develop a model of credit-fueled bubbles in which rational but imperfectlyinformed agents ride bubbles while gauging the potential pro…ts if they can successfully time the market versus the potential losses if the bubble bursts before they can sell. Boz and Mendoza (2014) show that a model with Baynesian learning about a regime shifting loan-to-value limit can produce a pronounced run-up in credit and land prices followed a sharp and sudden drop. The one-period debt contract in their model causes credit and the land price to move in tandem on the downside-a feature that is not consistent with the gradual deleveraging observed in the data. Nevertheless, the Bayesian updating mechanism in their model shares some of the ‡avor of the moving average forecast rules in our model. Using a model that abstracts from shifts in lending standards, Adam, Kuang, and Marcet (2012) show that the introduction of constant-gain learning can help account for recent cross-country patterns in house prices and current account dynamics. Constant-gain learning algorithms are similar in many respects to moving average forecast rules; both formulations assume that agents apply exponentially-declining weights to past data when constructing forecasts of future variables.
In a review of the literature on housing bubbles, Glaeser and Nathanson (2014) conclude: "It seems silly now to believe that housing price changes are orderly and driven entirely by obvious changes in fundamentals operating through a standard model"(p. 40). Moving average forecast rules depart from the "standard model"of rational expectations but nevertheless are consistent with a wide variety of survey evidence. In a study of data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) report that "starting in 2004, more and more households became optimistic after having watched house prices increase for several years" (p. 407). In a review of the time series evidence on housing investor expectations from 2002 to 2008, Case, Shiller, and Thompson (2012) …nd that "1-year expectations [of future house prices changes] are fairly well described as attenuated versions of lagged actual 1-year price changes"(p. 282). Jurgilas and Lansing (2013) show that the balance of households in Norway and Sweden expecting a house price increase over the next year is strongly correlated with nominal house price growth over the preceding year.
Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva (2014) develop a model of house price swings that shares some common features with ours, i.e., long-term mortgage debt and shocks to the mortgage interest rate and lending standards. Under perfect foresight, their model cannot explain the U.S. house price boom-bust episode. In contrast, a version with "shocks to expectations" does a much better job of …tting the data. Gete (2014) shows that introducing the Case-Shiller-Thompson survey expectations into a standard DSGE model can help account for movements in U.S. house prices over the period 1994 to 2012. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) show that measures of investor expectations about future stock returns are strongly correlated with past stock returns. Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino (2013) show that one-year ahead in ‡ation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are well-described by an exponentially-weighted moving average of past in ‡ation rates.
Research that incorporates moving average forecast rules or adaptive expectations into otherwise standard models include Sargent (1999, Chapter 6) , Evans and Ramey (2006) , Lansing (2009 ), Huang, Liu, and Zha (2009 ), Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino (2013 , and Gelain and Lansing (2014) , among others. Huang, Liu, and Zha (2009) state that "adaptive expectations can be an important source of frictions that amplify and propagate technology shocks and seem promising for generating plausible labor market dynamics."
Model
Housing services are priced using a version of the frictionless pure exchange model of Lucas (1978) . The representative household's problem is to choose sequences of c t and h t to maximize
subject to the following equations
where c t is real household consumption expenditures, h t is the housing service ‡ow, y t is real disposable income, is the subjective time discount factor, and t 0 measures the strength of the agent's housing preference which is subject to a persistent exogenous shock u t . The symbol b E t represents the household's subjective expectation, conditional on information available at time t; as explained more fully below. Under rational expectations, b E t corresponds to the mathematical expectation operator E t evaluated using the objective distribution of shocks, which are assumed known to the rational household. The symbol p t is the price of housing services in consumption units. The law of motion for the stock of household debt is given by equation (5), where`t is new borrowing during the period, and t 2 (0; 1] is the amortization rate, i.e., the fraction of outstanding mortgage debt that is repaid during the period. Real disposable income growth x t follows an exogenous AR(1) process given by equation (6). The gross real mortgage interest rate R t 1 + r t is subject to a persistent exogenous shock t :
Following Kydland, Rupert, and Šustek (2012) , we model the mortgage amortization rate using the following law of motion
where 2 [0; 1) and 0 are parameters and the ratio`t=b t+1 measures the size of the new loan relative to the end-of-period stock of mortgage debt. When = 0, we have t+1 = 1 for all t from (9) and`t = b t+1 from (4), such that we recover a one-period mortgage contract where all outstanding debt is repaid each period. When > 0; the above law of motion captures the realistic feature that the amortization rate is low during the early years of a mortgage (i.e., when`t=b t+1 ' 1) such that mortgage payments consist mainly of interest. The amortization rate rises in later years as more principal is repaid. Kydland, Rupert, and Šustek (2012) show that appropriate settings for the parameters and can approximately match the amortization schedule of a 30-year conventional mortgage.
We assume that households face the following constraint on the amount of new borrowing each period`t
where m t is a lending standard variable that is subject to a persistent exogenous shock v t . Equation (10) says that the size of the new loan`t cannot exceed a fraction m t of expected home equity, i.e., next period's expected housing value b E t p t+1 h t minus next period's mortgage debt b t+1 . We interpret an increase in m t to represent a relaxation of lending standards while a decrease in m t is a tightening of standards. 8 For simplicity, we assume that the lender's subjective forecast b E t p t+1 h t coincides with the household's subjective forecast.
The representative household's optimization problem be formulated as
where the current-period Lagrangian $ t is given by
where t ; t ; and t are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint (4), the borrowing constraint (10), and the law of motion for the endogenous amortization rate (9), respectively. In each constraint, we have used equation (5) to eliminate the new loan amount`t. The household's …rst-order conditions with respect to c t ; h t ; b t+1 ; and t+1 are given by
where we make use of the fact that t+1 is known at time t because b t+1 is known at time t: In equation (18), we have simpli…ed things by dividing both sides by b t+1 : After dividing both sides of equation (16) by t ; we can see that the "dividend"or imputed rent from owneroccupied housing consists of two parts: (1) a utility ‡ow that is in ‡uenced by the stochastic preference variable t , and (2) the marginal collateral value of the house in the case when the borrowing constraint is binding, i.e., when t > 0: 9 Equation (17) shows that when mortgage debt extends beyond one period ( t+1 < 1); the household takes into account the expected lending standard variable m t+1 when deciding how much to borrow in the current period. This is an element of shock propagation that is unique to an environment with long-term mortgage debt. With one-period debt ( t+1 = 1; = 0); equation (17) simpli…es to t = t b E t t+1 R t+1 : 10 Assuming that housing exists in unit net supply, we have h t = 1 such that t = 1 for all t: Imposing t = 1 in the above equations and dividing both sides of the applicable equilibrium conditions by current period income y t to obtain expressions in stationary variables yields:
where the last three equations are the normalized versions of the budget constraint, the borrowing constraint, and the law of motion for the amortization rate.
Rational Expectations
Details regarding the rational expectations solution are contained in the appendix. We transform the equilibrium conditions (19) through (24) so that the household's decision variables correspond to the three endogenous objects that the household must forecast, namely: (1) a composite variable z t (p t =y t ) exp (x t ) that depends on the price-income ratio p t =y t and the income growth rate x t , (2) a composite variable w t t = (1 + m t ) that depends on the borrowing constraint shadow price t and the lending standard variable m t ; and (3) the amortization rate shadow price t : There are six state variables: (1) the normalized stock of mortgage debt b n;t b t =y t 1 ;
(2) the mortgage amortization rate t ;
(3) the housing preference shock u t ; (4) the lending standard shock v t ; (5) the income growth rate x t ; and (6) the mortgage interest rate shock t : The state variables b n;t and t are endogenous while the other four state variables are exogenous, as governed by the AR(1) laws of motion (3), (12), (6), and (8). To solve for the household decision rules, we employ a log-linear approximation of the transformed equilibrium conditions. The approximation point is the ergodic mean rather than the deterministic steady state. 11
Moving Average Forecast Rules
The rational expectations solution is based on strong assumptions about the representative household's information set. Speci…cally, the rational solution assumes that households know the stochastic processes for all exogenous shocks. The survey evidence described in Section 1.2 shows that there is strong empirical support for extrapolative or moving average type forecast rules, particularly in the housing market. As shown originally by Muth (1960) , a moving average forecast rule with exponentially-declining weights on past data will coincide with rational expectations when the forecast variable evolves as a random walk with noise. In this case, the weight on the most-recent observation is linked to the signal-to-noise ratio. Along these lines, Coibion and Gorodnichencko (2012) …nd "systematic evidence of a delayed response of mean forecasts to macroeconomic shocks for professional forecasters, consumers, …rms, and central bankers consistent with the predictions of imperfect [noisy] information models" (p. 155). Fuhrer (2012) estimates "a small and economically insigni…cant role for rational expectations and lagged dependent variables...once the information in survey expectations is taken into account." More generally, a moving average forecast rule can be viewed as boundedlyrational because it economizes on the costs of collecting and processing information. As noted by Nerlove (1983) "Purposeful economic agents have incentives to eliminate errors up to a point justi…ed by the costs of obtaining the information necessary to do so...The most readily available and least costly information about the future value of a variable is its past value" (p. 1255).
Motivated by the empirical evidence, we postulate that the household's forecast for a given variable is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past observed values of that same variable. Constructing such a forecast requires only a minimal amount of computational and informational resources. From equations (19) through (24), we see that the household must construct four separate forecasts:
where the parameter 2 [0; 1] governs the weight assigned to the most recent observationanalogous to the gain parameter in the adaptive learning literature. When = 1; households employ a simple random walk forecast such that b
are constructed in the same way. For simplicity, we assume that the household employs the same value of for all forecasts.
Substituting the moving average forecast rules into the transformed …rst-order conditions yields a set of nonlinear laws of motion for the three decision variables z t ; w t ; and t : Details are contained in the appendix. Tables 1 and 2 show the values of the model parameters that we employ in the simulations. The parameters in Table 1 are the same for both expectation regimes (rational versus moving average) but in some cases di¤er across mortgage speci…cations (one-period versus long-term). From Figure 1 , we see that the plotted ratios from U.S. data are all close to their long-run means in the mid-1990s. Anticipating the reverse-engineering exercise, we choose the values of ; , and m simultaneously so that the ergodic-means of three model-implied ratios are close to their U.S. data counterparts at 1995.Q1. The three ratios are: (1) house price-rent, (2) housing value-income, and (3) mortgage debt-income. By construction, we also match the debt-to-value ratio at 1995.Q1. Data on U.S. house prices and imputed rents from owneroccupied housing are from the Lincoln Land Institute. 12 Data on U.S. residential real estate values and household mortgage debt are from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. Data on personal disposable income and population are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' FRED database.
Parameter Values
Following Kydland, Rupert, and Šustek (2012) , the values of and are chosen so that the amortization schedule for the model's long-term mortgage roughly approximates the amortization schedule of a conventional 30-year mortgage. With long-term mortgage debt, we require a lending standard parameter of m = 0:012 to match the ratios in the data whereas the oneperiod debt model requires m = 0:595. In the models with long-term mortgage debt, the loanto-value ratio di¤ers from the debt-to-value ratio whereas these two ratios coincide in the models with one-period debt. The mean debt-to-value ratio is given by m=[1+m (1 e ) exp( x)];
where e is the mean amortization rate. Our calibration procedure yields e = 0:0162 with longterm mortgage debt versus e = 1 with one-period debt.
The parameter in the moving average model governs the forecast weight assigned to the most recent data observation. We use the same value of for each of the four conditional forecasts that appear in the households's …rst order conditions (19) through (24). To get a sense of a reasonable value for , we run the following regression using quarterly data on mean survey forecasts for 4-quarter-ahead GDP price in ‡ation for the period 1970.Q2 to 2012.Q4, as reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters:
where the regression equation is simply a rearranged version of a moving average forecast rule. 13 The left-side variable is the change in the mean forecast of in ‡ation relative to the previous quarter's mean forecast. The right-side regressors are a constant term and the most recent forecast error, i.e., t b E t 1 t ; where t is 4-quarter GDP price in ‡ation, i.e., the variable being forecasted. 14 The regression results imply = 0:755 which is highly signi…cant. Moreover, the R-squared statistic is 84% which shows that the mean survey forecast of in ‡ation is well-described by a simple moving average forecast rule. 15 Based on these results, we employ the value = 0:8 in the moving average model. Table 2 shows the parameter values that govern the persistence and volatility of the four stochastic shocks. The parameter values for the housing preference shock u t and the lending standard shock v t depend on the expectation regime. We calibrate these shocks so that the rational expectations (RE) model and the moving average (MA) model can both match the standard deviations of the two U.S. housing market ratios plotted in the top panels of Figure  1 over the period 1995.Q1 to 2012.Q4. Analytical moment formulas derived from the loglinear solutions of both models are used in the calibration procedure. The calibration is done for the case of long-term mortgage debt but we use the same set of shock parameters in the case of one-period debt. From Table 2 , we see that the RE model requires a highly volatile housing preference shock with u = 0:348 versus u = 0:071 in the MA model. For the lending standard shock, the RE model requires v = 0:114 versus v = 0:092 in the MA model.
The stochastic process for income growth x t is estimated using data on the quarterly growth rate of U.S. real per capita disposable income. The parameter values for the mortgage interest rate shock t are estimated using data on the 30-year conventional mortgage interest rate. Both series (plotted in Figure 6 ) are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis'FRED database for the period 1995.Q1 to 2012.Q4. We convert the nominal mortgage interest rate into a quarterly real rate using 4-quarter-ahead expected in ‡ation (converted to a quarterly in ‡ation rate) from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Our calibration procedure ensures that the RE model and the MA model both exhibit realistic volatilities for the housing value-income ratio p t h t =y t and the mortgage debt-income ratio b t =y t . Consequently, the top panels of Figure 2 look similar to the top panels of Figure 3 . A crucial distinction between the two models can be seen by comparing the bottom left panels of Figures 2 and 3 . The RE model predicts a substantially more volatile rent-income ratio than the MA model. This is because the RE model's housing preference shock has u = 0:348 which is about …ve times larger than the corresponding value u = 0:071 in the MA model. The volatility of the housing preference shock directly in ‡uences the volatility of the rent-income ratio which is given by
Quantitative Results

Simulations with Model-Speci…c Shocks
where t = exp (u t ) is the stochastic housing preference variable. The …rst term on the right side of (27) is the housing service ‡ow while the second term is the marginal collateral value of the house. In the simulations, the volatility of the rent-income ratio is determined mainly by movements in the housing service ‡ow. With long-term mortgage debt, the coe¢ cient of variation for the rent-income ratio in the RE model is 0:66 versus 0:16 in the MA model. For comparison, the coe¢ cient of variation for the rent-income ratio in U.S. data is 0:10 over the period 1960.Q1 to 2012.Q4. For the more-recent period of 1995.Q1 to 2012.Q4, the coe¢ cient of variation is even lower at 0:02: The extremely low volatility of the rent-income ratio in the data argues against fundamental demand shocks as a key driver of the boom-bust episode. A virtue of the MA model is its ability to generate realistic volatility in the housing value-income ratio without the need for such large housing demand shocks.
The right-side panels in Figures 2 and 3 show that the long-term mortgage speci…cation delivers smoother behavior in the debt-income ratio b t =y t and the consumption-income ratio c t =y t relative to the one-period mortgage version of the same model. With long-term mortgage debt, shocks can have a large impact on the size of the new loan but the impact on the stock of outstanding debt is much smaller. This is because the new loan represents only a small fraction of the end-of-period stock of debt. In contrast, the new loan and the end-of-period stock of debt are equal with one-period mortgage debt, causing the debt-income ratio to be more responsive to shocks. 16 The normalized version of the household's budget constraint (22) shows that movements in the consumption-income ratio are linked to movements in the debt-income ratio. The smoother behavior of the debt-income ratio in the models with long-term mortgage debt translates into smoother behavior for the consumption-income ratio.
Impulse Response Functions with Common Shocks
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how a common stochastic shock propagates di¤erently in the four di¤erent model speci…cations. Figure 4 plots the model responses to a one standard deviation innovation of the housing preference shock u t . Figure 5 plots the model responses to a one standard deviation innovation of the lending standard shock v t : The vertical axes measure the percentage deviation of the variable from the no-shock value. All model speci…cations now employ u = 0:071 ( Figure 4) or v = 0:092 ( Figure 5) . These are the original calibrated values from the MA model, as shown in Table 2 .
Both …gures show that, regardless of the mortgage speci…cation, the MA model exhibits substantially more volatility in housing value than the RE model. In other words, the MA model exhibits excess volatility in the asset price in response to fundamental shocks. This result is not surprising given that the moving average forecast rule (25) embeds a unit root assumption. This is most obvious when = 1 but is also true when 0 < < 1 because the weights on lagged variables sum to unity. Due to the self-referential nature of the equilibrium conditions, the households' subjective forecast in ‡uences the dynamics of the object that is being forecasted. 17 Given that all shocks are governed by AR(1) laws of motion, a hump-shaped impulse response is indicative of an endogenous propagation mechanism in the model. The MA model with long-term mortgage debt is the only speci…cation to exhibit a hump-shaped response in both housing value and mortgage debt. The e¤ects of the shocks are temporary but highly persistent-lasting in excess of 100 quarters (25 years). The RE model with long-term mortgage debt can produce a hump-shaped response in debt but not housing value. Notice that the RE model with one-period mortgage debt does not produce a hump-shaped response in either housing value or debt. Hence, the dynamics of model variables in this version are driven entirely by the exogenous AR(1) shocks.
Another notable feature of the impulse response functions is the timing of the peaks in housing value versus mortgage debt. With one-period debt, both peaks occur at the same time. With long-term mortgage debt, the peak in housing value occurs well before the peak in debt. This is qualitatively similar to the pattern observed in Figure 1 for the U.S. data.
Reverse-Engineering the Shocks to Match the Data
We now undertake the main part of our quantitative analysis: reverse-engineering the sequences of stochastic shocks that are needed to exactly replicate the boom-bust patterns in U.S. household real estate value and mortgage debt over the period 1995.Q1 to 2012.Q4. All of the model state variables are set equal to their ergodic means at 1995.Q1. For each version of the model, we use the log-linearized versions of the decision rules and laws of motion in …rst-di¤erence form to back out sequences for the change in the housing preference shock u t and the change in the lending standard shock v t to match the change in the U.S. housing value-income ratio and the change in the U.S. mortgage debt-income ratio. For each period of the exercise, we have a linear system of two equations and unknowns, namely, u t and v t : Given the sequences for u t and v t ; we construct sequences for u t and v t using the initial conditions u t = v t = 0 at 1995.Q1. We use the …rst-di¤erence forms of the log-linear decision rules and laws of motion to eliminate constant terms in the model which, for some variables, may not coincide with the corresponding U.S. values in 1995.Q1. 18 As inputs to the reverse-engineering exercise, we use U.S. data for the period 1995.Q1 to 2012.Q4 to identify sequences for the change in disposable income growth x t and the change in the mortgage interest rate shock t : The data we use to identify x t and t are plotted in Figure 6 , where the trends are computed using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. We use the trends to identify x t and t in order to screen out high frequency movements in the data that would show up as noise in the reverse-engineered shocks, thus obscuring their economic interpretation. Given the identi…ed sequences for x t
When b
Et pt+1 = pt; we have V ar (pt) =V ar (dt) = 1= (1 ) 2 which implies excess volatility in the model asset price whenever j j < 1:
1 8 For example, the ergodic mean value of ct=yt in the model does not coincide with the U.S. consumptionincome ratio in 1995.Q1. Nevertheless, given a model-implied sequence for (ct=yt) ; we can construct a comparable model-implied sequence for ct=yt using the 1995.Q1 value in the data as the intital condition. and t ; we construct sequences for the state variables x t x and t using the initial conditions x t = x = 0:00452 and t = 0 at 1995.Q1. The time patterns of these state variables mimic the trends in Figure 6 . Figure 7 plots the results of the reverse-engineering exercise. The left panels show the reverse-engineered values of the housing preference shock u t and the lending standard shock v t in the RE model. The right panels show the corresponding shocks in the MA model. Analogous to the model simulations, the RE model requires large movements in the reverseengineered housing preference shock to match the data. The time pattern of the housing preference shock mimics the path of the U.S. housing value-income ratio in Figure 1 . This is true for both mortgage speci…cations. Hence, the RE model "explains" the boom-bust cycle in U.S. housing value as a wholly exogenous phenomenon. In contrast, the top right panel of Figure 7 shows that the MA model requires much smaller movements in the housing preference shock to match the same data. Again this is true for both mortgage speci…cations. Table 3 compares the properties of the reverse-engineered shocks across the four di¤erent model speci…cations. With long-term mortgage debt, the mean of the housing preference shock is 0.97 in the RE model versus 0.06 in the MA model. The standard deviation of the housing preference shock is 1.03 in the RE model versus 0.38 in the MA model.
The bottom panels of Figure 7 show that the reverse-engineered lending standard shock is highly dependent on the mortgage speci…cation, but is not sensitive to the expectation regime. With one-period mortgage debt, both the RE and MA models imply a near-zero lending standard shock during the boom years prior to 2007. The one-period debt speci…cation requires the stock of debt to move in tandem with housing value. Since the housing value run-up is driven by the preference shock, no additional shock is needed to explain the runup in mortgage debt. Things are di¤erent, however, during the bust years. To avoid the counterfactual prediction of a rapid deleveraging as U.S. housing values fell rapidly, the oneperiod debt models require a post-2007 relaxation of lending standards (i.e., a persistently positive value for the lending standard shock v t ) to simultaneously match the patterns of housing value and mortgage debt in the data.
With long-term mortgage debt, the new loan size moves in tandem with housing value but the stock of mortgage debt adjusts more slowly than housing value. In order to match the run-up in U.S. mortgage debt during the boom years, the long-term debt versions of the RE and MA models both require a substantial relaxation of lending standards during the boom years from 2001 to 2005, consistent with the empirical evidence cited in the introduction. The magnitude of the lending standard shock v t starts declining well before the peak in mortgage debt that occurs at 2007.Q4. A declining value of v t implies a tightening of lending standards. After 2007.Q4, both models require a persistently negative value for the lending standard shock which is indicative of even further tightening of lending standards during the Great Recession and beyond. Figure 8 plots two indicators of lending standard tightness from the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS). The indicators are the net percentage of U.S. domestic banks that are tightening lending standards for either residential mortgage loans or credit card loans. 19 Both series show that banks started to tighten lending standards before the onset of the Great Recession in 2007.Q4. Moreover, a substantial percentage of banks continued to tighten standards even after the recession ended in 2009.Q2. Overall, the SLOOS data con…rms the plausibility of the reverse-engineered lending standard shocks in the models with long-term mortgage debt. Figures 9 and 10 plot the model-implied paths for two other variables of interest, namely, the housing rent-income ratio given by equation (27) and the consumption-income ratio given by equation (22). We …rst construct log-linearized laws of motion for the change in both ratios in terms of the change in the model state variables. We then substitute in the identi…ed sequences for x t and t and the reverse-engineered sequences for u t and v t : As before, the endogenous state variables evolve according to their log-linearized laws of motion in …rst-di¤erence form. Figure 9 shows that both versions of the RE model predict a counterfactual boom-bust cycle in the rent-income ratio that is driven by the large movements in the reverse-engineered housing preference shock. In contrast, the predicted paths for the rent-income ratio in the MA model are much closer to the data. The endogenous bubble-like dynamics in housing value generated by the moving average forecast rules allows the MA model to be much less reliant on exogenous housing preference shocks to match the data. This helps to avoid the prediction of large movements in housing rents which are not present in the data. Figure 10 shows that all model versions imply similar paths for the consumption-income ratio. The normalized household budget constraint (22) shows that movements in the consumptionincome ratio are linked primarily to movements in the debt-income ratio and the mortgage interest rate which, by construction, are the same across models for this exercise. 20 The bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that a smoothed version of a typical model-implied path (constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter) exhibits a hump-shaped pattern that roughly resembles the hump-shaped pattern in the data from 1995 to 2012. Hence, abstracting from high-frequency ‡uctuations, all models predict a boom-bust cycle in consumption that is positively correlated with the boom-bust cycles in housing value and mortgage debt.
Counterfactual Scenarios
Our …nal quantitative exercise examines four counterfactual scenarios that are plotted in Figures 11 through 14 . In each case, we turn o¤ one of the four shock sequences that was constructed in the reverse-engineering exercise. Turning o¤ one shock at a time allows us to see which shocks are the most important drivers of the boom-bust episode, as interpreted through the lens of the model. Counterfactual scenario 1 (Figure 11 ) shuts o¤ the housing preference shock such that u t = 0 for all t. Regardless of the mortgage speci…cation, the RE models now exhibit no signi…cant run-up in housing value. This result con…rms the importance of the housing preference shock in "explaining"the run-up under rational expectations. In contrast, the MA models still exhibit a sizeable run-up in housing value, particularly in the version with long term mortgage debt which continues to be hit by loosening lending standards. This result illustrates the ability of our preferred model to generate a credit-fueled boom in housing value.
Counterfactual scenario 2 ( Figure 12 ) shuts o¤ the lending standard shock such that v t = 0 for all t. The models with one-period mortgage debt now imply a rapid deleveraging that coincides with the rapid decline in housing value. Recall that the models with one-period debt require an implausible sequence of looser lending standard shocks after 2007 to match the gradual deleveraging in the data. Once this shock sequence is turned o¤, the stock of debt moves down in tandem with housing value. In contrast, the models with long-term mortgage debt show no signi…cant run-up in mortgage debt when the lending standard shock is turned o¤. According to these models, shifting lending standards were an important driver of the boom-bust episode. The MA model with long-term mortgage debt is the only one to show smaller boom-bust cycles in both housing value and mortgage debt when the lending standard shock is turned o¤.
Counterfactual scenario 2 can be interpreted as a stylized macroprudential policy experiment; it shows what would have happened if mortgage regulators had enforced prudent lending standards during the boom years. According to our preferred model (MA with long-term mortgage debt), such action by regulators would have helped to restrain the boom on the upside such that the subsequent bust and the associated economic damage would have been less severe.
Counterfactual scenario 3 ( Figure 13 ) shuts o¤ the income growth shock such that x t = x for all t: The RE models continue to exhibit signi…cant boom-bust cycles in both housing value and debt. For these models, movements in income growth are not an important driver of the episode. The MA model with one-period debt exhibits a smaller boom-bust cycle in housing value but a larger boom-bust cycle in debt. The (implausible) post-2007 loosening of lending standards in this version of the model accounts for the larger boom-bust cycle in debt. The MA model with long-term mortgage debt is the only one to exhibit smaller boom-bust cycles in both housing value and debt when the income growth shock is turned o¤. This result shows that movements in income growth did contribute something to the combined boom-bust episode according to this version of the model.
Counterfactual scenario 4 ( Figure 14) shuts o¤ the mortgage interest rate shock such that t = 0 for all t: All model versions continue to exhibit signi…cant boom-bust cycles in both housing value and debt. This is because the magnitude of the U.S. mortgage interest rate drop is simply too small to have much impact on housing value and debt. Figure 6 shows that the trend value of the quarterly real mortgage interest rate declined by only 30 basis points from 1995.Q1 until 2005.Q4. After 2005.Q4, the interest rate continued to decline by about 45 basis points. These interest rate moves are not su¢ cient to appreciably alter the trajectories of housing value and debt in the presence of the other three shocks. According to the models, the decline in the U.S. mortgage interest rate was not an important driver of the boom-bust episode. 21 Our results regarding the mortgage interest rate con ‡ict with the empirical …ndings of Taylor (2007) and McDonald and Stokes (2011) who argue that the Fed's decision to keep interest rates arti…cially low during the boom years helped fuel the housing bubble. 22 Other studies, however, …nd that low interest rates were not a important contributor to the U.S. housing boom. Dokko, et al. (2011) present evidence that movements in U.S. house prices were much larger than can explained by the historical relationship between house prices and interest rates. An empirical study by Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2013) …nds that lower real interest rates can explain only about 20% of the rise in U.S. house prices from 1996 to 2006. One way to reconcile these various …ndings is to postulate that the low interest rate environment at the time fostered excessive risk-taking behavior by lenders. 23 This explanation is consistent with widespread use of imprudent lending practices during the boom years of the U.S. housing market.
To summarize: the quantitative experiments show that our preferred model with moving average forecast rules and long-term mortgage debt does best in plausibly matching the boombust patterns plotted in Figure 1 . 2 1 In experiments with the models, we …nd that doubling the magnitude of the total mortgage interest rate drop to about 150 basis points is necessary to obtain a signi…cant e¤ect on the trajectories of housing value and mortgage debt.
2 2 In a long-run historical study of many countries, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2014b) …nd that loose monetary conditions typically contribute to booms in house prices and real estate lending.
2 3 Adrian and Shin (2010) and Jiménez, et al. (2014) present evidence that low interest rate environments contribute to increased risk-taking by lenders.
Conclusion
Episodes of explosive, bubble-like growth in house prices have occurred in many OECD countries over the past four decades (Engsted, Hviid, and Pedersen 2014) . A recent cross-country empirical study by Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2014b) concludes that "Mortgage booms are an important source of …nancial instability in the post-WWII era"(p. 40). Our simple quantitative asset pricing model helps to shed light on the underlying causes of the recent boom-bust cycle in the U.S. housing market. A clear understanding of these causes is important because it can help in the design of policy actions to avoid future crises.
The o¢ cial report of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) states: "We conclude this …nancial crisis was avoidable. . . Despite the expressed view of many on Wall Street and in Washington that the crisis could not have been foreseen or avoided, there were warning signs. The tragedy was that they were ignored or discounted" (p. xvii). The report lists such red ‡ags as "an explosion in risky subprime lending and securitization, an unsustainable rise in housing prices, widespread reports of egregious and predatory lending practices, (and) dramatic increases in household mortgage debt."
Our preferred model of the boom-bust cycle in the U.S. housing market includes the following elements: (1) households who employ simple moving-average forecast rules that give rise to excess volatility in asset prices, (2) long-term mortgage contracts that cause the stock of outstanding household debt to adjust more slowly than the ‡ow of new loans, and (3) relaxed lending standards during the run-up that created the conditions for a credit-fueled housing bubble. Our results further suggest that policy actions by regulators to control the ‡ow of mortgage credit by enforcing prudent lending standards can limit a housing boom on the upside, such that the subsequent bust and the resulting economic turmoil may be less severe.
A Appendix: Equilibrium Conditions in Stationary Variables
Starting from the equilibrium conditions (19) through (24), we de…ne the following stationary variables: z t (p t =y t ) exp(x t ); w t t = (1 + m t ) ; b n;t b t =y t 1 ; and c n;t c t =y t : After substituting in these de…nitions, the transformed equilibrium conditions are
(1 t+1 ) t+1 + (1 ) ; and we have substituted in t = exp (u t ) ; R t = R exp ( t ), and m t = m exp (v t ) for all t: The decision variables are z t ; w t ; and t : The six state variables are b n;t ; t ; u t ; v t ; x t ; and t :
We …rst use (A.4) through (A.6) to eliminate c n;t ; b n;t+1 and t+1 from (A.1) through (A.3). We take logarithms of (A.1) through (A.6) and apply a …rst-order Taylor series approximation to each equation. The Taylor-series coe¢ cients are functions of the ergodic-mean approximation points e z; e w; e ; e b n ; and e . The conjectured forms for the solution (B.1) through (B.3) are iterated ahead one period. From these, we eliminate b n;t+1 and t+1 using the log-linearized versions of (A.5) and (A.6) and then eliminate u t+1 , v t+1 ; x t+1 , and t+1 using the AR(1) laws of motion (3), (12), (6), and (8), respectively. After collecting terms, we analytically compute the conditional rational forecasts E t z t+1 ; E t w t+1 ; E t t+1 ; and E t exp ( t+1 ) : In each case, the forecast computation introduces a new constant term that depends on the innovation variances 2 u ; 2 v ; 2 x ; or 2 : We substitute the conditional rational forecasts into the log-linearized versions of (A.1) through (A.3). After collecting terms, these equations are now in the form of the conjectured solution (B.1) through (B.3). The mapping from the actual solution to the conjectured solution yields a system of 18 equations in the 18 unknown solution coe¢ cients s i ; h i ; and f i for i = 1 through 6.
Finally, we evaluate the original nonlinear equilibrium conditions (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.5) and (A.6) at the ergodic-mean approximation points to obtain expressions for the constant terms in the corresponding Taylor-series approximations of the same equations. These relationships are substituted into the mapping from the actual solution to the conjectured solution. This mapping (which includes the new constant terms from computation of the rational forecasts) yields 5 equations that pin down the 5 approximation points e z; e w; e ; e b n ; and e :
C Appendix: Solution with Moving Average Forecast Rules
We …rst use (A.4) through (A.6) to eliminate c n;t ; b n;t+1 and t+1 from (A.1) through (A.3). The moving average forecast rules take the form b E t q t+1 = q t + (1 ) b E t 1 q t ; where q t+1 2 z t+1 ; w t+1 ; t+1 ; R t+1 are the four variables to be forecasted. Substituting the forecast rules into (A.1) through (A.3) and then solving for z t ; w t ; and t yields a set of nonlinear laws of motion for the three decision variables. The lagged forecasts now appear in these laws of motion as state variables. For example, the law of motion for z t is given by
which depends in a nonlinear way on w t : Straightforward but tedious algebra yields explicit (albeit complicated) expressions for z t ; w t ; and t in terms of the following ten state variables:
For use in the reverse-engineering exercise, we also compute log-linear approximations of the decision rules and laws of motion in the moving average model. For example, the log-linear decision rule for z t takes the form
exp [a 3 u t + a 4 v t + a 5 (x t x) + a 6 t ]
where a i for i = 1 through 10 are Taylor series coe¢ cients. The approximation points are the deterministic steady-state values b n ; ; z; w; ; and R: Unlike the rational expectations solution, computation of the conditional forecasts in the moving average model does not introduce any new constant terms involving 2 u ; 2 v ; 2 x ; or 2 : Hence, is not necessary to shift the approximation points away from the deterministic steady-state values in the moving average model. Figure 2 : Model simulations with rational expectations. A volatile housing preference shock is needed to match the standard deviation of the housing value-income ratio in the data, This results in a highly volatile time series for the housing rent-income ratio, which is counterfactual. Movements in debt and consumption are much smoother with long-term mortgage debt. Figure 3 : Model simulations with moving average forecast rules. Only a small housing preference shock is needed to match the standard deviation of the housing value-income ratio in the data. The rent-income ratio exhibits low volatility, consistent with the data. Movements in debt and consumption are much smoother with long-term mortgage debt. Figure 4 : When all models are subjected to the same housing preference shock, the moving average model exhibits substantially more volatility in housing value. All else equal, the models with long-term mortgage debt exhibit more persistent debt dynamics than the models with one-period debt. With long-term mortgage debt, housing value peaks before debt, as in the data. Figure 5 : When all models are subjected to the same lending standard shock, the moving average model exhibits substantially more volatility in housing value. All else equal, the models with long-term mortgage debt exhibit more persistent debt dynamics than the models with one-period debt. With long-term mortgage debt, housing value peaks before debt, as in the data. Figure 9 : The large reverse-engineered housing preference shocks in the RE models generate a counterfactural boom-bust cycle in the rent-income ratio. The much smaller reverse-engineered housing preference shocks in the MA models generate less movement in the rent-income ratio, which is closer to the pattern observed in the data. 
